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We examine firms' decisions to hire managers in a duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. 
In contrast with the case in which the public firm competes with a domestic private firm -where only the private firm 
decides to hire a manager- we find that both firms hire managers. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one 
obtained when neither firm hires a manager.
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     1.  Introduction. 
This paper examines firms’ decisions to hire managers when a public firm with social 
welfare objectives competes with a foreign private firm with profit objectives.  
The issue of strategic managerial contracting in the context of private firms has been widely 
analyzed since the early contributions of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), 
who showed that owners of profit-maximizing-firms have an incentive to hire managers 
that pursue objectives different from simple profit maximization.  By doing so in a publicly 
observable way, owners pre-commit to a strategy they find profitable when the reaction of 
their competitors is taken into account. 
Strategic managerial contracting in the context of mixed markets, where public firms and 
private firms compete, has been studied by, among others, Barros (1995), White (2001) and 
Barcena-Ruiz (2007)
1. Barros (1995) studies the effects of managerial contracting in a 
model that includes both agency problems within the firm and strategic motives. White 
(2001) concentrates on the strategic aspects of managerial contracting and endogenizes 
firms’ decisions to hire managers. Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) follows White’s approach and 
investigates the effect of changing the mode of product-market competition –from Cournot 
to Bertrand.  Our approach is similar to Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) and White (2001), which we 
closely follow.    
Most models of mixed markets -including Barros (1995), White (2001) and Bárcena-Ruiz 
(2007)- assume that private firms are domestic. Some exceptions are Fjell and Pal (1996), 
Fjell and Heywood (2002) Matsumura (2003) and Lu (2006, 2007), who include foreign 
private firms.  The introduction of such firms into the analysis is important because in 
reality mixed oligopolies often include them and this inclusion alters the objective function 
of the public firm.  Yet, there is no analysis of the effect of foreign ownership of private 
firms in the hiring of managers in mixed markets.  In this paper we attempt to fill this gap 
by considering a duopoly consisting of a state-owned firm and a foreign private firm. 
Our main results are that, if the weight associated to the foreign firm’s profits in the social 
welfare function is low enough, then: i) in contrast with the case in which the private firm is 
domestic – where the public firm decides not hire a manager- in equilibrium both the public 
and the foreign private firm hire managers, and ii) this equilibrium is associated with a 
social welfare higher than the one obtained when neither firm hires a manager.      
2.  The Model. 
We consider a duopolistic model in which a public firm (firm 0) and a foreign private firm 









1 Nakamura and Inoue (2007) and Nishimori and Ogawa (2005) also consider models with managerial 
contracting in mixed oligopolies, along the lines of Barros (1995) and White (2001).  They do not analyze, 
however, the decision to hire managers, which is the focus of our paper. where  , i= 0,1, represents firm i’s output.  i q
We assume, as in White (2001), that both firms have constant marginal costs and –to avoid 
trivial results, as will later become clear- that the public firm is less efficient than the 
private one:  , where   denotes firm i’s marginal cost.  0 1 0 c c < < i c
The owners of the foreign private firm seek to maximize the firm’s profits: 
1 1 1 1 q c pq − = π                                                                                                                      (1) 
In contrast, the owners of the public firm maximize social welfare, defined as the sum of: i) 
consumer surplus, ii) the profits of the public firm, and iii) a proportion [ 1 , 0 ∈ ] γ  of the 
profits of the foreign private firm: 
1 1 0 0
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1 0 ) ( ) ( 2 / ) ( q c p q c p q q W − + − + + = γ                                                                        (2) 
This definition contains as a particular case (when  0 = γ ) the usual assumption that the 
profits of the foreign private firm are excluded from social welfare.  Yet, it also allows for 
the situations suggested by Fjell and Pal (l996) in which a fraction of the foreign firm’s 
profits could be included in the social welfare, as well as partial foreign ownership. 
The owners of each firm can hire a manager to make the firm’s production decisions.  If 
this happens, the manager of firm i seeks to maximize a linear function   of firm i’s 
profits 
i O
i π  and revenues  :  i R
i i i i i R O ) 1 ( β π β − + =                                                                                                           (3) 
This manager’s objective function is supported by the assumption that the manager is 
offered a managerial contract of the form  i i i i T O M + =α , where  i α and  are terms that do 
not affect the manager’s incentives but allow the firm to adjust the manager’s payment to 
his opportunity cost. 
i T
The manager’s objective function   can be rewritten as:  i O
i i i i q c p O ) ( β − =                                                                                                                   (4) 
which makes it clear that the term  i β can be interpreted as a discount factor on costs: the 
manager is instructed to consider  i ic β  as the marginal cost of production.  This incentive 
parameter  i β  allows the owner of the firm to make their manager a more ( 1 < i β ) or less 
(1 > i β ) aggressive competitor than a profit maximizing firm. 
We follow Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) and White (2001) and examine the following three-stage 
game: in the first stage, the owners of each firm choose whether or not to hire a manager.  
In the second stage, the owners of firms who hired managers select incentive parameters  
for them.  In the third stage, the managers of the firms or, in their absence, their owners, 




3.  Analysis of the different hiring decisions 
To look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, we first examine each of the 
(four) subgames that follow the initial firms’ hiring decisions and solve the game 
backwards. 
3.1 Both firms hire managers 
When both firms hire managers, the simultaneous maximization of these managers’ 
objective functions, as given by (4), leads to the following output at stage three: 
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= , i=0, 1;  j= 1 - i                                                                    (5) 
where the superscript b denotes that both firms hire managers. 
At stage two, the owners of the public firm choose  0 β  to maximize social welfare, as given 
by (2), and the owners of the foreign private firm choose  1 β to maximize the firm’s profits, 
as given by (1).  Both types of owners anticipate stage-three output quantities as given by 
(5). Simultaneous maximization of these objective functions leads to the following choice 
of incentive parameters: 
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[] 1 , 0 ∈ γ , while such an assertion cannot be made for the public manager’s incentive 






1 β γ .  So, as the 
weight attached to the foreign firm’s profits decreases,    decreases and the public firm’s 
manager is more aggressive, while the opposite happens to the foreign firm’s manager.  In 
the polar case where 
b
0 β
0 = γ (and, more generally, when γ  is sufficiently low) both incentive 
parameters are smaller than one. This is in contrast with White (2001) –which corresponds 
to the case  1 = γ - in which only  is unambiguously smaller than one. 
b
1 β
  Replacing the incentive parameters given in equation (6) into the output functions 
(equation 5) we obtain: 
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Notice that, as in White (2001), when  1 0 c c =  the foreign private firm produces nothing and 
the public firm produces the socially optimal output,  (which implies  ) ( 0 0 c a q
b − = 0 c p = ).  
To avoid this (trivial) result, we keep White’s  assumption that  0 1 c 0 c < < .   











                                                                              (7) 
We will assume condition (7) (
b c c 0 0 < ) throughout. If this condition holds for  1 = γ  (in 
which case it coincides with the assumption made in White (2001)) it will also hold for all 
1 < γ .   
3.2 Only the foreign private firm hires a manager 
At the third stage, the manager of the foreign private firm maximizes the objective function 
given by equation (4) and the owners of the public firm maximize social welfare, as given 
by equation (2).  These maximization problems lead to: 
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≡ ,   with  1 * 1 < β  if condition (7) holds. 
At stage two, the owners of the foreign private firm choose the incentive parameter  1 β  to 










≡ γ  where 0 < * γ <1. 
When * γ γ > , the solution of the foreign firm maximization problem is: 
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When  * γ γ ≤ , maximization of the foreign firm’s profits leads to: 
1
0 1









=   ,  
) 2 (




− − − −
=
c c c a
q
f ,    
) 1 ( 2
















c c f  
) 1 ( 4
) (
) 1 ( 4






1 0 1 0 0 1 0
2













c c c c c a c c c c a
W
f  
3.3 Only the public firm hires a manager. 
In this case, at the third stage the manager of the public firm maximizes the objective 
function given by equation (4), while the owners of the private firm maximize profits.  This 
leads to the output functions: 
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Where the superscript p indicates that only the public firm hires a manager. 
At the second stage, the owners of the public firm choose the incentive parameter  0 β  to 
maximize social welfare.  This results in: 
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Condition (7), which guarantees that  , also implies that    0 0 >
b q 0 0 >
p q
3.4 Neither firm hires a manager 
In this case, at stage three the owners of the foreign private firm will maximize profits 
while the owners of the public firm will maximize social welfare.  The simultaneous 
solution of these problems yields: 
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where the superscript n indicates that neither firm hires a manager and, again, condition (7) 
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4.  Managerial Game Solution. 
We can now analyze the first stage of the game, in which owners decide whether or not to 
hire a manager.  The solution is given in the following proposition, where   
} 7494 . 0 *, min{ * * γ γ ≡ , with   1 * * 0 < < γ : 
Proposition 1.  In the subgame perfect equilibrium, i) if  * * γ γ ≤ , both the public firm and 
the foreign private firm hire managers, while ii) if  * * γ γ > , only the private firm hires a 
manager. 
Proof: See appendix. 
To gain some intuition for why the managerial solution prevails for low values of  γ , let us 
compare this result with White (2001), which corresponds to the case γ =1 -when the whole 
private firm’s profits are included in social welfare.  It is useful to perform this comparison 
 
 
6in terms of how much output is produced and how this production is shared between the 
public firm and the more efficient private firm when i) both firms hire managers, and ii) 
only the private firm does so.  This comparison shows that the managerial solution becomes 
more attractive both in terms of output level and output allocation for low values ofγ . 
When γ =1, total output is higher if only the private firm hires a manager than if both firms 
do. Moreover, this higher output is produced more efficiently, since all production is 
carried out by the more efficient private firm, while output production is shared between 
the two firms when both of them hire managers.  Thus, by not hiring a manager, the public 
firm obtains a better outcome both in terms of total output production and output allocation. 
 Now, as we reduce γ , we reach a point ( * γ ) below which public output is no longer zero 
if only the private firm is run by a manager. For low values of γ , the choice of the public 
firm also hiring a manager becomes more attractive both in terms of output production and 
allocative efficiency: 
i)  When * * γ γ ≤ , private output is higher -and public output is lower- when both 
firms hire managers than when only the foreign firm does so.  Thus, for small 
values of γ  a higher fraction of total output is produced by the more efficient firm 
when both firms hire managers than when only the private firm does so. 
ii)   When  * γ γ ≤ , the difference in total output between both regimes decreases as we 
reduce γ  until it becomes zero when γ =0. 
We finally analyze the effect of hiring managers on social welfare, as compared with a 
situation in which owners make output decisions. 
Proposition 2.  For any  [] 1 , 0 ∈ γ , social welfare is higher when both the public and the 
foreign private firm hire managers than when neither of them do so. 
Proof: See appendix. 
The positive effect of hiring managers on social welfare that White (2001) finds for the 
case γ =1 extends to the case γ <1.  As in White (2001), this effect s occurs despite the fact 
that the managerial regime yields a lower total output (and thus a lower consumer surplus) 
than the one obtained when the owners make decisions.  But, it is worth mentioning that as 
γ  is reduced the difference in total output between both regimes –and thus the difference in 





In this paper, we have examined the effect on changing the nationality of the private firm in 
a mixed duopoly where firms may hire managers to make output decisions.  We have done 
this in a setting that allows for situations intermediate between the usual cases of (total) 
domestic or foreign ownership of the private firm. We have found that the result that only 
the private firm hires a manager does not hold when the weight associated to the private 
firm’s profits is sufficiently low.  In such a case, both firms hire managers.  This translates 
into a social welfare higher than the one that would prevail if neither firm hired managers. Appendix. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
We will show that  ,  if and only if
n p W W >
f b W W > } 7494 . 0 *, min{ * * γ γ γ ≡ < , 
p b
1 1 π π >  and  (with strict inequality for 
n f
1 1 π π ≥ γ >0). We have: 
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which is negative when condition (7) holds.  To see this, rewrite condition (7) as 
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Maximization of ( ) when 
f b W W − * γ γ >  with respect to  ) ( 1 0 c c −  and   subject 
to ,  and condition (7) shows that W achieves a maximum of 
zero when  =  = 0 and is negative for other values. 
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To prove that  (with strict inequality for 
n f
1 1 π π ≥ γ >0) we can directly compare their values 
which, for the case  * γ γ <  yields: 
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c c n f  (except for γ = 0), 
or we can use a revealed preference argument:  is the maximum profit than can be 
obtained when only the foreign firm chooses an incentive parameter  for its manager at 





1 1 = β  -thus instructing its manager 
to maximize profits- in which case the stage-three market equilibrium will be exactly the 
same as the one obtained when neither firm has a manager.  This can be seen by comparing 
 
 
8the output choices  ,   in equation (9) with the values that  ,  take when the foreign 





* 1 1 β β > =  in equation (8).  Since the foreign firm does 
not choose   at stage two (except for  1 1 =





Proof of Proposition 2. 
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